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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT. 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE BURK, a8 Administratix of the 
Estate of RICHARD E. ROSER, deceased. 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
CHARLES PETER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent takes no exception to the statement of 
the case presented by appellant in his brief (pp 1-20). 
For the sake of brev«rity, therefore, respondent will 
avail herself of the appellant's statement of facts, and 
will make such comment thereon, coupled with appropri-
ate references to the transcript, as she may deem neces-
sary in the development of hfr argument. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant in his brief (pp 20, 21) assigns seven 
errors which constitute the basis for his prayer that 
this court reverse the judgment of the District Court 
in the instant case. Appellant's argument under topic 
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(a) entitled ''Defendant's Competency as a Witness 
Was Waived by the Administratrix" (pp 22-31) deals 
with assignments 5 through 7. The argument under 
topic (b) (pp 31-39) entitled "The Plaintiff Failed in 
Her Burden of Proof on the Question of Consideration,'' 
deals with assignment 4. Assignments 1, 2, and 3 are 
dealt with generally, if at all, by appellant under both 
topics (a) and (b). Accordingly, respondent will divide 
this brief in to two topics corresponding to the two topics 
set forth by appellant in his brief, and will therein 
attempt to answer, under these respeceive topics, all 
the assignments of error and arguments made by 
appellant. 
(a) Defendant's Competency as a Witness was not 
Waived by the Administratrix. 
The circumstances occurring during the trial which 
constitute the basis of the alleged waiver by the adminis-
tratrix of the so-called "Dead Man's Statute" are not 
disputed. Appellant has corectly stated in his brief the 
factual basis of this legal controversy in the following 
language, (pp 22, 23): 
''Miss Burk, the administratrix, testified on di-
rect examination, in support of her case as plain-
tiff, that the deceased stated he was desperately 
in need of money and had written a letter to Mr. 
Peter, but hadn't mailed it (Tr. p. 7). The con-
versation was for the purpose of connecting Ex· 
hi bit "C" w·ith the note and the "amount of 
payment thereon" (Tr. p. 6). While it was stated 
tha~ the letter, Exhibit "C" was not going to be 
offered, the plaintiff, nevertheless, and in connec-
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tion 'vith her tesimony, offered the same and it 
zvas received in evidence on the question as to 
zuhether there had been any payment made on 
the nvte (Tr. p. 8. ") (Italics added). 
Appellant ~ontends that inasmuch as the adminis-
tratrix was called upon to testify as to a conversation 
which she had had with the decedent relative to the non-
payment of the note, the statutory disqualification im-
posed upon the defendant was thereby waived by the 
} administratrix, and that defendant thereby became com-
. petent to testify as to other transactions with the 
: deceased relative to the execution of the note and the 
consideration, if any, which was given therefor. Re-
1 spondent contends that this conclusion is unsound, and 
will, in the arguments appearing under this topic, 
attempt to so prove . 
.:. The statute which controls this controversy is set 
~ forth as follows. (Because of its grammatical com-
: plexity, the writer of this brief has taken the liberty of 
c omitting those portions of the statute which he deems are 
immaterial to this controversy) : 
''The following persons cannot be witnesses : 
(3) A party to any civil action, ... when the 
adverse party in such action, . . . sues . . . as 
administrator ... of any deceased person, as to 
any statment by, or transaction with, such de-
ceased ... person, or matter of fact whatever, 
which must have been equally within the know-
ledge of both the witness aHd such . . . deceased 
person, unless such witness is called to testify 
thereto by such adverse party . " 104-49-2, U. 
C.A. 1943. 
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It will be oberved that the statute provides that the 
incompetency of the party sued by the deceased's ad-
ministrator shall be waived when the administrator 
himself calls such adverse party as a witness. It might 
be added, parenthetically, that this is not a blanket 
waiver, but only a limited one. It permits the witness 
to testify in his own behalf only as to those transactions 
about which he was interrogated by the administrator, 
and to none others. N olty' s Administrator v. Fultz, 261 
Ky. 516 (1935); Kraft v. Security State Bank, 54 S.D. 
325, 223 N.W. 208 (1929). 
The problem involved in the instant case, however, 
does not call for an application of the above ''statutory 
waiver,'' but rather the recognition of a ''non-statutory 
waiver.'' In our situation the adversary to the dece-
dent's estate was never called upon by the administratrix 
to testify. Rather, the administratrix herself testified 
as to a conversation which she had had with the decedent. 
Appellant contends that this testimony constituted a 
complete waiver of the statutory disqualification, and 
that it should have opened the door to allowing the 
defendant to testify concerning all other transactions or 
conversations with the decedent having any bea.ring 
upon the issues triable under the pleadings. Appellant 
argues, in other words, that this court should recognize 
and give effect to a ''non-statutory waiver,'' and that 
this waiver should be given the broadest possible 
application. 
Appellant has eorrectly stated that the Utah Su-
preme Court has never decided whether the so-called 
"non-statutory waiver" should be recognized in this ju-
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risdictiou (p ~3). The Honorable James H. Wolfe, in his 
article entitled d Competency of Witnesses in Utah to 
Testify to Transactions With Deceased, Insane or In-
competent Persons,'' Utah Bar Bulletin, July-August, 
1941, Vol. XI, Nos. 7 and 8, Stated on page 80: 
"·The competency is avoided when the adverse 
party (the one maintaining· the integrity of the 
deceased's interests) calls the witness; and the 
incompetency may be waived by failing to make 
objection to the witness or by objecting to the evi-
dence only. Probably the witness may testify as 
to otherwise forbidden subjects when the party 
protecting the estate opens up the subject, but 
this is undecided. ' ' 
As appellant pointed out ~n his brief (p 23), the Utah 
case of Garner v. Thomas 94 Utah 287, 75 Pac. 2d 168, 
{1938) apparently approved this doctrine. Inasmuch 
as that portion of the opinion relating to this doctrine 
was subsequently deleted, (Garner v. Thomas, 94 Utah 
295, 78 Pac. 2d 529), the question still remains one of 
first impression. 
Respondent does not contend ·in this brief that the 
doctrine of the ''non-statutory w·aiver'' should not be 
adopted in this jurisdiction. It might he stated in pass-
ing that many jurisdictions have refused to adopt it. 
Bushee v. Surles, 77 N.C. 62 (1877); Fountain v. Lynrn 
57 N .J .L. 503 ; Miller v. C arvnon, 84 Al. 59 ( 1887) ; C ana~ 
day v. Johnson 40 Iowa 587 ( 1875). On the other hand 
many jurisdictions, and perhaps most of them, have 
seen fit to adopt this ''non-statutory waiver'' doctrine, 
on the grounds that it makes possible a fairer trial. 
The following passage is illustrative of this point of 
VIew: 
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"The privilege of objecting to the competency of 
the adverse party is also deemd to he waived if 
the representative himself testifies or introduce,s 
testimony as to the transaction or communication 
in question. When the representative has in-
troduced evidence as to transactions between the 
deceased and the adverse party, the court has no 
discretion in the rna tter to receive or reject the 
testimony as it sees fit, but it must receive the 
testimony of the adverse party, if it is offered 
in such case.'' (Citing cases). Jones Commen-
taries on Evidenee, 2nd Ed., Vol. 5, Sec. 2280, 
page 4436. 
The postition of the respondent in this brier is that 
the ''non-statutory waiver'' doctrine is probably a good 
one, but that if it is adopted, it should he adopted with 
the same limitations as have qualifiied it in all other 
jurisdictions in which the doctrine has been recognized. 
It is respondent's contention that wherever this doctrine 
has been adoptea the scope of its application has been 
limited by allowing the witness to testify only as to 
those conversa.tions or transactions with the dece-dent 
which are directly related to the tra;nsaotion about w~hich 
the administrator has tesbified. In other words, it is 
our contention that the waiver must be a qualified and 
limited one, and that it must not be made so broad as 
to admit any testimony and all testimony relating to the 
controversy in issue. Its effect must he that of ad-
mitting only such evidence as relates to the issue which 
was opened up by the administrator's testimony. This 
writer has examined every case cited by appellant in his 
brief purporting to adopt the waiver doctrine. In not 
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one single ease cited did the court extend the benefit of 
the ""aiYer as far as appellant would have this court 
do in the instant case. Moreover, two of these cases, 
Carter -v. Curlew Creamery Co1npany, 134 Pac. 2d 66, 
and J.n. Re Fitzpa.trick Estate, 206 N.Y. Supp, 496, made 
express mention of the very limitation on the scope of 
the waiver 'Y hich ""e are here discussing. 
In the instant case 1:Iiss Burk, the administratrix, 
testified on direct examination as to a conversation 
'vhich she had had with the decedent which related to 
the issue of whether the note had been paid by the de-
fendant. Appellant contends that by virtue of Miss 
Burk's having so testified, the appellant was therefore 
rendered qualified to testify as to all transactions with 
the deceased relating to the execution of the note and 
the consideration therefor. We contend that if the 
''non-statutory waiver'' doctrine should have been ap-
plied by the lower court to the foregoing set of facts, then 
it should have been applied o~y to the extent of allowing 
the defendant to testify as to any transactions which he 
had had with the decedent relating to the paymen.t of the 
note. But inasmuch as the proffered testimony did not 
so relate, we contend that it was properly excluded, even 
under the waiver doctrine. We feel that it would be 
grossly unjust to allow the waiver, whose benefit de-
fendant seeks, to be extended so far as to strike down 
the defendant's disqualification to testify on all issues 
in the case involving a transaction with the deceased. 
It is quite apparent that the issue of payment and the 
issue of consideration are as distinct and separate as 
two issues could possibly be in any single trial. The 
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occurrence of the facts relating to the issue of payment 
are separated by many years in time, and by many miles 
in distance, from the occurrence of the facts relating 
to the issue of consideration. 
The doctrine of waiver is essentially an equitable 
doctrine and can he employed where such employment 
will further justice. In Corpus Juris, Vol. 67, "Waiver" 
Sec. 2, we read the following: 
"It (waiver) is a doctrine, resting upon an equit-
able principle, which courts of law will recognize, 
that a person, with a full knowledge of the facts 
shall not be permitted to act in a manner incon-
sistent with his former position or conduct to 
the injury of another; a rule of judicial policy, 
the legal outgrowth of judicial abhorrence, so 
to speak, of a person's taking inconsistent posi-
tions and gaining advantages thereby through 
the aid of courts.'' 
In the instant case this court might well conclude 
that inasmuch as the administratrix herself testified as 
to a conversation with the decedent relative to the non-
payment of the note, it would be only just and equit-
able to allow the defendant to give his version of the 
facts relating to that single issue, even though to do so 
might require his testifying as to a conversation which 
he had had with the decedent. In other words, the court 
in this situation is confronted with the problem of balan-
cing public policies. On the one hand, it faces that public 
policy which closes the mouth of a person to testify as 
to transactions had with a deceased person. On the 
other hand, the court faces an opposing public policy 
which discourages the partial presentation of the facts 
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of a transaction, and encourages the full presentation 
thereof. This principle is well stated in the poetic 
words of Alexander Pope: 
· • .. ..-\. little kno\Yledge is a dangerous thing; 
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring. 
Its shallo"~ draughts intoxicate the brain. 
Drinking· largely, so hers us again." 
In other words, if the administratrix should desire to 
go into the facts of a particular transaction, it is only 
just that she should allow her adversary to fill out the 
picture by giving· his version of those, and all facts 
related to that transaction. However, this reasoning 
makes no sense when the adversary attempts to intro-
duce forbidden testimony relating to transactio:Q.s en-
tirely unrelated to the transaction about which the 
testatrix testified. How could the application of the 
doctrine of waiver perform any equitable function in 
this situation~ It must be kept in mind that the recog·-
nition of this doctrine under any circumstances consti-
tutes an enroachment on the literal interpretation of 
the "Dead Man's Statute." It follows that the scope 
of the doctrine should be extended cautiously. As 
stated above, respondent has not found one single 
case which extends the doctrine of waiver far enough 
to give comfort to appellant in his situation. On the 
contrary, respondent has found many cases which ex-
pressly limit the doctrine in the manner herein con-
tended. This limitation on the waiver doctrine is ex-
pressed by Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd Ed., 
Vol. 5, Sec. 2284, page 4448, in the following language: 
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''The adverse party is competent only as to those 
transactions or communications concerning which 
testimony has been given, but he may, of course, 
go fully into all those transactions. (Citing cases). 
The courts of some states hold that if the rep-
resentative introduces testimony as to any trans-
action with the deceased or incompetent person, 
the adverse party may testify generally and to 
any extent. But the general rule is as stated. 
The adverse party may not testify as to any 
transactions other than those concerning which 
the representative has introduced evidence, even 
though such testimony as to a separate and in-
dependent transaction or communication would 
tend to contradict the testimony given as to the 
transaction in question. •' 
If the above rule be accepted by this court as the 
better rule and the one to he adopted in this jurisdiction, 
then the only remaining question is whether evidence 
relating to the payment or non-payment of the note on 
the one hand and evidence relating to the execution and 
consideration for the note on the other hand, consti-
tutes evidence relating to the ''same transaction.'' It 
is manifestly our contention that these constitute two 
different transactions and that the waiver of the admini-
stratrix goes to evidence relating to the one transaction 
but not to the other. The cases hereinafter discussed 
will illustrate what other courts have considered to he 
a single transaction or a multiplicity of transactions. 
In the case of H a bart v. Verrault, 7 4 .App. Div. 444, 
77 N.Y.S. 483 (1902), the evidence tended to show that 
one Zellie Verrault executed a note in favor of N. F. 
10 
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Ho,ve. ....\fter the maker's death the plaintiff, holder 
of the note, sued her administrator for the amount 
thereof. The answer to plaintiff's complaint set up, 
among other thing·s, the defense of forgery. At the 
trial the defendant administrator testified that he was 
familiar "'"ith decedent's handwriting, and that the sig-
nature on the instrument involved in the suit was It 
forgery. Plaintiff thereafter placed the payee of the 
note on the stand and had him testify that the signature 
on the note was that of the decedent, and that the dece-
dent had properly delivered the instrument to him, 
the payee. This testimony was objected to for the 
reason that its introduction violated Sec. 829 of the 
New York Code of Civil Procedure, which provision 
prohibited any party to an action against the estate of 
a decedent from being a witness in his own behalf con-
cerning a personal transaction between the witness and 
the deceased person. On appeal, the appellate division 
of the Supreme Court of New York held so much of the 
foregoing testimony as tended to prove the circumstances 
under which the note was deli"\Tered to the payee should 
have been excluded. Plaintiff's argument that the defen-
dant had waived the protection of the statute by testi-
fying that the purported signatures were forgeries, 
was answered by the court with the argument that the 
waiver only went to the narrow point at issue which the 
defendant was attempting to prove, i.e. forgery, and 
not to the issue of delivery of instrument. 
Respondent feels that this case is squarely in point. 
It will be noted that the broad issue was whether or not 
the note was valid. Contained within that larger issue 
l!l 
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were the two sub-issues as to whether the signature was 
a forgery, and whether the instrument had been properly 
delivered. The court held in effect that these issues 
were so unrelated that the introduction of testimony re-
lating to one of them did not constitute a waiver of the 
right to preclude the introduction of testimony relating 
to the other. It will be readily seen that this case is 
closely analogous to our case in which the broad issue 
is whether the note is a valid and subsisting obligation, 
and the two sub-issues are whether the note was issued 
for a consideration, and whether the note had been paid. 
The only point in which this case differs from our 
case is that the New York statute governing this case, 
eontrary to the corresponding~ Utah statute, had a 
specific provision to the effect that the introduction 
of testimony by the administrator concerning a parti-
cular transaction constituted a waiver by him of the 
disqualification of the adverse party to testify as to 
that transaction, ''Revised Statutes, Codes and General 
Laws of New York" 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, "Evidence" Sec. 
3, Page 1261. In other words, the New York statute 
apparently codified the so-called "non-statutory waiver" 
discussed in this brief. It would appear, however, that 
this distinction clearly makes ours an .a fortiori case, 
inasmuch as a court would be less likely to extend the 
scope of a non-statutory waiver, whose very recognition 
is at variance with the literal provisions of the statute, 
than it would be to extend the scope of a waiver speci-
fically created by statute. The case of Clift v. Moses, 
112 N.Y. 426, 20 N.E. 392 (1889) is another New York 
case illustrating the tendency of the court to limit the 
scope of a waiver. 
12 
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.... \ppellant, in his brief, cited the case of Carter v. 
Curle~Creantery CoJnpauy, sttpr(~. This case is not in 
point, since it inYolves an application of the ''statutory 
"~aiver'' provided by that section of the statutes of the 
State of ''Tashington comparable to our own Sec. 104-
49-2. See Rem. Rev. Statutes (Washington) Sec. 1211. 
In other 'Yords, this case involves a situation in which 
the party "·hose interests were adverse to those of the 
estate, 'vas called to testify by the administratrix as to 
a transaction with the deceased. However, even though 
the case is not strictly in point, it is worth considering 
for a moment in this brief, because it gives splendid 
discussion of the 'Yisdom of limiting the scope of the 
"statutory waiver." We submit that the reasons which 
impelled the Washington court to limit the scope of the 
''statutory "~aiver,'' are equally impelling, if not more 
so, to limit the scope of the non-statutory waiver in the 
instant case. 
In the Carter case, one Ira Carter instituted an 
action against the defendant business firm, to vacate 
its prior corporate dissolution and to require an account-
ing. During this action the plaintiff died and his wife, 
as executrix, was substituted in his stead. One of the 
issues at the trial was whether the decedent, a former 
officer of the corporation, had been properly notified 
of the directo:ri meeting at which the resolution to dis-
solve the corporation had been passed. Another issue 
was whether at the time of such meeting the decedent 
was still an officer of the corporation.. During the 
trial a witness whose interests were adverse to those 
of the estate (and who was therefore disqualified under 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Washington statute), and who had been secretary of 
the corporation at the time of the aforesaid meeting, 
was called by the executrix and asked, ''Is this (referring 
to t:ije minute book) the one plac.e that you find your 
father voted his (the decedent's) stock~'' Answer: ''My 
father has always voted Carter's stock, and Mr. Carter 
has never objected.'' This question was apparently 
asked in an attempt to show that the decedent had not 
been notified of the meeting. Subsequently, this same 
witness was put on the stand by the defendants and 
was asked ''Whether she had ever heard the decedent 
say to its employees, in her presence, that he had no 
interest in the corporation.'' This question, which was 
properly objected to, wa.s asked in order to show that 
the deeedent disclaimed any interest in the corporation. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington held that 
the question asked. by the defendant with regard to 
whether the decedent had claimed any interest in the 
corporation was improper. The court recognized the 
statutory waiver, but held that it could not be extended 
to admit evidence as to all issues in controversy, but· 
only to the narrow issue about which the witness for 
the executrix was initially called upon to testify. In 
that connection, the court made the following statement: 
"It may be conceded that appellant did introduce 
certain testimony relative to transactions and 
conversations with the deceased, and as to those 
transactions first developed by appellant, the 
benefit of the statute was waived, and respon-
dents had the right to introduce evidence relative 
to those transactions and all other circumstance8 , 
necessary to explain them. But although the 
14 
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statute 1n ay ha ce been 1caived as to those parti-
cltlar transacf.ivn.s upeued up by appella.nt, the 
lcai·rer does uot e~.rteud to unrelated transactions 
aud coucersatiou.s. Kraft v. Security State Bank, 
- i s D ·)·).- ·)·)·) 'T TIT ·)o8 w·1k· :-; s1 1 a J-:~: • • t:> ..... J. ---0 l.\. "'. .... ~ 1 1n::s v. {Og un , 
1~7 ~eb. 38~)~ :236 N.,v~. 31; Nolty's Adm'r v. Fultz, 
:2Gl Ky. 516, 88 S.W. 2d 35.'' (Italics added) . 
.... \.ppellant in his brief attempts to cast disrepute on 
the Dead :Jlan 's Statute by quoting from Wigmore. In 
response to this irrelevant attack, the following answers 
are made: (a) The Dead :Nlan 's Statute serves a wise 
and beneficial purpose. (See one of the most recent 
treatments of this statute by the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of JJ axfi eld v. Sainsbury ____________ Utah ____________ , 
172 Pac. :2d 122 (1946) wherein the court gives a sym-
pathetic discussion of the general aims and purposes 
thereof) ; (b) this statute, and other statutes having 
similar import, are in· force in almost every state in 
this country; (c) this statute is now, and has been the 
law in Utah (having undergone some changes) since 
at least the year 1876 (See Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, 
Title XI, Sec. 377; and (d) this statute is not on trial 
in this case, and therefore all references to its merit 
are irrelevant. 
(b) The Plaintiff Sustained Her Burden of Proof 
on the Question of Consideration. 
The District Court found that the note in question 
was ''executed and delivered to said Richard E. Roser 
for a valuable consideration, and that there was no want 
or lack of consideration, for the execution thereof" (Tr. 
p 010, Finding No. 5). Based upon this finding, the 
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court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover from the defendant the amount of the note, plus 
fees and costs (Tr. p 010), and rendered judgment to 
that effect. 
To this finding, and the judgment rendered thereon, 
the defendant excepted, for the reason that the evidence 
adduced by the plaintiff was not sufficient to support a 
finding that the note in question was supported by good· 
consideration. 
It is submitted that the record is replete with sub-
stantial, competent evidence, sufficient in law to support 
the court's finding that the note in question was sup-
ported by good consideration. 
Before discussing this point, let it be remembered 
that the duty of the Supreme Court in this appeal is not 
to review the evidence as though this were a trial de 
novo, and to match its judgment as to the probative 
value of the evidence introduced at the trial below, 
against that of the trial judge. Probably no principle 
of law relating to appellate practice has received more 
frequent enunciation by this and other courts than that 
expressed in the case of Knighton v. Manning, 84 Utah 
1, 33 Pac. 2d 401 (1934), wherein this court said, on 
page 408: 
''In an action at law a finding of the trial court 
usually is approved if there is sufficient com-
petent · evidenc.e to support it, though the evi-
dence with respect thereto may be in conflict 
and the finding apparently against a prepon-
derance or the greater weight of the evidence.'' 
16 
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Surely no one at this late date questious the validity 
of this just principle. Accordingly, appellant, in order 
to convince this court that the finding- of the trial 
court relatiYe to consideration must be reversed, must 
show that there is no substantial evidence in the record 
tending to sho'v the existence of such consideration. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is not only 
substantial evidence tending to support the finding 
of consideration, but that such evidence preponderates 
over all conflicting evidence. 
The following evidence, as shown by the record, 
is respectfully called to the attention of this court as 
tending to show the presence of consideration : 
a) The note, by using the words ''for value re-
ceived,'' indicates on its very face that it W'a.S given 
by the defendant to plaifntiff 's decedent for good and 
valuable consideration. Appellant in his brief attempts 
to prove to this court that the statutory presumption 
of consideration (Sec. 61-1-25, U. C. A. 1943) which 
attaches to every negotiable instrument is not considered 
to be evidence having any probative value, but is to be 
considered only as a point of departure, indicating upon 
whom rests the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence. Respodent finds no fault with the statement of 
the rule as set forth by appellant. There is one fact 
which appellant bas completely overlooked, however, 
and that is~tt! words "for value received''' are entitled 
to definite probative value in and of themselves, W 
apart from the statutory presumption of consideration 
with which the note as a whole is clothed. It is well 
17 
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settled that the words "for valuable consideration," or 
their equivalent, appearing in the body of a note, have 
the force of an admission by the maker of the presence 
of consideration. 
Thus, in the case of Owens v. Blackburn, 146 N.Y. 
S. 966 (1914), the New York court said, on p. 967: 
''The note not being·· payable to bearer or order 
. is non-negotiable, * * * and there would therefore 
be no presumption of consideration; but the 
recital "value received," in the body of the note, 
constitutes an admission that the instrument was 
issu.ed for a suffi'Cien.t con.sider.ation." (Italics 
added). 
Likewise, in the case of Hance Hardw·are v. Howard, 
8 A. 2d 30, ( 1939), the court said: 
''There is a double presumption of a valuable 
consideration attached to the present note. ( 1) 
It is a negotia.ble instrument. * * * ( 2) The note 
sued upon, over the signature of the defendant, 
includes the words 'value received' * * * The 
presence of the words, however, has always been 
a prima facie acknowledgment or admission by 
the makers of the receipt of a sufficient con-
sideration. Palmer v. Blanchard, 113 Me. 380, 
94 A. 220; Ow·ens v. Blackburn, 161 App. Div. 
827, 146 N.Y.S. 966; Du Bosque v. Munroe, 168 
App. Div. 821, 154 N.Y.S. 462; Hamilton v. Ham· 
ilton., 127 App. Div. 871, 112 NY.S. 10. '' 
It is respondent's position, therefore, that the 
presenc.e of the words ''for value received'' on the face 
of the note, are equivalent to an admission by the maker 
of the note that the latter was issued for valuable con-
18 
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sideration. ...\dmittedly, it is not conclusive. Like any 
other admission, it ean be explained, or even denied. 
But, standing by itself, it is certainly entitled to the 
dignity of being considered substantial evidence. 
b) The entire circuntstances connected with the 
tnakiHg of the note indicate that it w·as supported by 
valid consideratio~n. Consider the note itself: It was 
for a large sum of money. It is inconceivable that the 
maker, a man experienced in business practices, would 
transfer to another man his negotiable promissory note 
unless he intended to be bound thereby. A $5,000.00 
negotiable promissory note is not a play thing. Defen-
dant certainly must have known this. Defendant cer-
tainly knew that in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, 
all personal defenses on the instrument would be cut off. 
If defendant did execute the note without consideration, 
intending it as a joke, or perhaps as an ac.c.ommodation 
to the decedent, to bolster his credit rating, it is cer-
tainly logical to believe that he would have made some 
effort to retrieve it after its purp·ose had been fulfilled, 
rather than leaving it in the payee's hands for five and 
one-half years. Moreover, the note provides for reason-
able attorney's fees in the event that it should not be 
paid, and the holder should have to sue. This is cer-
tainly not the language of a man who does not intend 
to pay, but rather that of a man who does intend to 
make every effort to discharge an honest obligation. 
c) The correspondence between the parties subse-
quent to the execution of the note, and the statements 
and transactions by the decedent, reveal unmistakeably 
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that both parties con.sidered the note to be a valid and 
subsisting obligation, upon which full payment w·as ex-
pected. The letter marked Exhibit "C ", written 
by the decedent to the defendant shortly before the 
former's death, states, in part: 
"Karl, what have I done that I deserve such neg-
lect. I could he discharged at once for three 
days of creeping and two weeks on crutches 
would do the trick. But I cannot leave with an 
unpaid hoard bill. I just wonder now how this 
matter is coming out. In ten years you have not 
been able to plank down even 15% of the amount 
you owe me and that Canadian affair is just 
another fa ta morgana. '' 
This letter shows that just prior to his death, the 
decedent felt that the defendant was indebted to him 
for a substantial amount of money which had not been 
paid. On page 11 of the transcript we read where Miss 
Burk, on cross examination, stated, with reference 
to the aforesaid letter: "He (decedent) told me he had 
written Mr. Peter for some money that was owing him." 
Later, both Mrs. and Mr. Morgan testified to the 
effect tha.t the decedent had desired to buy a part of 
Mr. Morgan's business, but that he had finally decided 
that h~ could not make it for the reason that the de-
fendant refused to pay him some money which he owed 
him. In one place, the testimony indicated that this 
indebtedness arose out of a note for approximately 
$5,000.00, which is the amount of the note in controversy 
in this action. 
The following excerpts are taken from the 
transcript: 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. · ~. N O\\T, did you have any other conversation 
'vith ~Ir. Rth;er concerning· this nob.', or indebtedness 
owing· by nlr. Peter to nlr. Roser ol'' 
A. (.~Irs. l\Iogan) H Yes, sir." 
Q. d\Vill you state "There, and when~" 
A. "'\\Tell, ~Ir. Morgan 'Yas figuring on selling his 
business and ~Ir. Roser was thinking of buying.'' 
Q. ''And that was about three years before he 
died!" 
A. Yes sir." 
Q. ''State what was said.'' 
A. ''He said 'He would like to buy the business, 
because he had controlled it so long, and knew every-
thing about it, but I haven't the money. Mr. Peter 
owes me a note, but I cannot get the money." (Tr. pp 
21, 22, 23). 
Q. "You say that Mr. Roser told you he couldn't 
buy your husband's business because Mr. Peter owed 
him some money that hadn't been paid, is that right~'' 
A. (Mrs. ~forgan) "Yes sir." 
Q. "Just what was his attitude~" 
A. ''He wanted the business very much. He liked 
it. He enjoyed it, and he wanted to buy when he found 
Mr. Morgan wanted to sell.'' 
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Q. ''The only thing that prevented him was the 
fact Mr. Peter had not paid him what he owed him~" 
A. "Well that is what he told us." (Tr. p 28). 
A. (Mr. Morgan) "Mr. Roser, when he was at the 
home, said 'That he would like to purchase the business.' 
Tha.t is the time that I thought I would like to get rid 
of part of my business, and he expressed himself as 
being desirous of purchasing it, and he said 'He had a 
note of approximately five thousand due from Mr. 
Peter, and if he could collect on that he could probably 
swing the deal.'' (Tr. p 31). 
A. (Mr. Morgan) "Oh, he expressed himself as 
being interested several times, but this is where it came 
to, or was really brought out to a head, that he ex-
pressed himself as being very desirous of purchasing 
"t " 1 . 
Q. ''And at all times it was stated the reason he 
could not purchase the property was because Mr. Peter 
owed him money that he had not paid~'' 
A. ''He had to raise money.'' 
Q. "Did he say Mr. Peter owed him money'" 
A. "That is right." (Tr. 35 ). 
Q. "But you want the court to understand that 
the rea.son he didn't buy your business was because 
he couldn't make his collection from Mr. Peter~" 
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A. "That 'vas a great factor in it." (Tr. 37). 
In the letter from defendant to decedent, marked 
Exhibit ~ ~ 0 ", a11d dated ~{ay 17, 194:±, the defendant 
implies that he o'ves decedent a large sum of money, 
because he says: ''I have never let anyone down, in-
tentionally, and I never shall do so, however at the 
moment I could not square a $25.00 debt. * * * '' 
This series of letters, statements and transcripts 
reveals but one thing·: that between July 26, 1940, and 
the date upon which decedent died, the decedent enter-
tained the definite impression that the defendant owed 
him a substantial amount of money. This amount was 
at least large enough to help decedent buy a portion of 
a prosperous business. On one occasion, decedent even 
\vent as far as to state that the debt was for approxi-
mately $5000.00. In our opinion, this positive evidence 
has great probative value in proving the presence of 
consideration. 
In the trial of this case, defendant did not adduce 
one bit of direct or convincing evidence tending to prove 
that there was no consideration in support of the note. 
Yet the law is clear that to overcome the presumption 
of consideration which attaches to every valid negoti-
able instrument, (and a fortiori to one which recites a 
valid consideration on its face) the proof must he clear 
and conviP~ing, Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Washington 451, 
93 P. 2d 709. Defendant's evidence is only of such 
character as tends to lead to conclusions by negative 
inference. Thus defendant argues that since there was 
no reference to the note in decedent's personal effects, 
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it must be concluded that decedent did not consider it 
to be a thing of value. On the contrary, there is every 
evidence that 'the decedent did consider it to he a thing 
of value. Consider the fact that he had carefully pre-
served the note itself among his business files. (Tr. 33). 
In fact, it might be argued that the very fact that the 
decedent preserved the note for five and one-half years 
indicates that he must have ascribed some value to 
it. Otherwise, he would have destroyed it. 
Appellant then argues that sinc.e there is no evi-
dence that decedent made demand for payment after 
the maturity of the note, notwithstanding the fact that 
payment was demanded on other accounts, this indicates 
that decedent did not consider that there was any 
amount owing. Appellant's premises however, are equi-
vo.cal. Respondent's testimony quoted above shows 
clearly that the indebtedness was never out of the 
decedent' mind. His last letter (Exhibit "0"), which. 
decedent wrote so close to his death that it was never 
sent, was the plea of a dying man for the defendant to 
pay off this long standing obligation. The absence of 
any single document specifically making demand for 
payment of the note, is explainable by the fact that 
the defendant and the decedent were close friends and 
frequently associated with each other. It is quite prob-
able that decedent made specific. oral demand for pay-
ment of the note during one of his many visits with the 
defendant. 
The other arguments of the defendant are of a 
similar vein. They are all based on equivocal inferences. 
We feel tha.t it is unnecessary to devote further space 
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to demonstrating the \Yeakness of appellant's evidence, 
since the la\\'" does not impose such duty upon us. Our 
responsibility is only to sho\Y that the record contains 
some substantial evidence ,v·hich can sustain the judg-
ment of the District Court. This, "\Ve feel, has already 
been done. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary·, respondent contends that the District 
Court did not err in excluding· defendant's proffered 
testimony relating to transactions between the defend-
ant and the deceased relative to the execution and the 
consideration given for the note in question. Respond-
ent further contends that the substantive evidence in-
troduced during the trial by the plaintiff was sufficient 
in every respect to support a finding by the District 
Court to the effect that the promissory note was valid 
and subsisting· in every respect. Accordingly, it is 
contended that the judgment appealed from should be 
sustained. 
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